Guarantees have a primary role in debt contracts. They alter the risk for the lender, transform borrowers' incentives and, eventually , modify the equilibrium allocation of financial resources. This paper studies the role of guarantees on bank loans, using a sample of over 50,000 individual lines of credit granted by Italian banks. Two empirical models are used. The first directly verifies the relationship between ex-ante publicly available information on borrowers' default riskiness and the presence of guarantees on their bank loans; the second compares the interest rates charged on secured and unsecured loans made by different banks to a same borrower, thus perfectly controlling for its idiosyncratic riskiness and singling out the direct effect of the presence of guarantees on credit risk. The empirical results show that real guarantees (physical assets or equities that the lender can sell to obtain the payments in case of default of the borrower), that are often internal, are mainly used to provide a priority to some creditors. Personal guarantees (contractual obligations of third parties to make payments in case of default of the borrower, e.g. suretyships), that can only be external, are used instead as incentive devices against moral hazard problems. Controlling for borrowers' characteristics, both real and personal guarantees reduce ex-ante credit risk.
Introduction
A large number of bank loans are backed by guarantees. Berger and Udell (1990) report that in the United States nearly 70 per cent of all commercial and industrial loans are made on a secured basis. Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Binks et al. (1988) report similar or even larger ratios for Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively.
The consequences of guarantee requirements for the availability of bank financing have been studied in a large number of papers, both theoretical and empirical. Information asymmetries in bank relationships can alter significantly the allocation of credit with respect to what would be socially optimal (i.e., that all projects with a positive net present value − NPV − will be financed; see, e.g., de Meza and Webb, 1987) . Backing loans by guarantees may help to alleviate these distortions, by reducing moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The guarantee transforms borrowers' incentives, alters the risk for the bank and eventually modifies the equilibrium credit allocation. Smith and Warner (1979) , for example, argue that "the issuance of secured debt lowers the total cost of borrowing by controlling the incentive for stockholders to take projects that reduce the value of the firm"; Stulz and Johnson (1985) show that in some cases the recourse to secured debt may permit to finance positive NPV projects that otherwise would not be financed.
However, the requirement of guarantees on bank loans can also introduce new inefficiencies in credit allocation. For example, banks might devote fewer resources in screening and monitoring projects financed with secured loans, as the guarantees themselves help reducing credit risk (see, e.g., Manove et al., 2000) . Therefore, if banks are more qualified than the average investor to evaluate projects, credit allocation may be less efficient when a larger fraction of loans is made on a secured basis. Moreover, if banks find it less expensive to require guarantees than to monitor projects, it is possible that investors that cannot provide them will not be financed, even if the NPV of their investment is positive.
Further, additional distortions might be introduced if some banks, watching at collateral requirements made by other institutions, free ride on their auditing activity. As shown by Rajan and Winton (1995) , this may lead to too few monitoring with respect to the optimal level.
One of the crucial issues in the analysis of secured bank lending is whether guarantees are required to safer or riskier borrowers. Different answers have been given to this question, by considering the predictions of theoretical models, the conventional wisdom among bankers, the results of econometric analyses. This paper provides some additional empirical evidence on the relationship between risk and guarantees on bank loans, using high quality data on over 50,000 individual lines of credit granted by a large sample of Italian banks. Two major results are found. First, that borrowers with higher ex-ante probability of default are more likely to be required to post personal guarantees (contractual obligations of third parties to make payments in case of default of the borrower, e.g. suretyships), that can only be offered by an external grantor, but not real guarantees (physical assets or equities that the lender can sell to obtain the payments in case of default of the borrower, typically owned by the borrower). Second, that, controlling for borrowers' risk, secured loans are charged lower rates than unsecured loans. This result is novel to the literature, 1 but it is consistent with the predictions of a large body of theoretical research and with the common wisdom within the banking community.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly summarizes theoretical and empirical results of the literature on the relationship between borrowers' risk and guarantees on bank loans. Section 3 discusses the hypotheses under scrutiny and the empirical models adopted. Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis. The final section concludes.
Risk and collateral on bank loans

Theoretical results
The predictions of the theoretical literature on the relationship between risk and guarantees strongly depend on the informational framework that is adopted. 2 Following the seminal contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , a large class of models has been developed assuming that banks cannot observe borrowers' characteristics, so that the average interest rate on loans is higher than the rate that would be optimal for safe borrowers, if they could be identified. This creates an adverse selection problem, because only riskier borrowers apply for bank loans. In the original model the equilibrium entails some degree of credit rationing.
However, a possible alternative is to allow loan applicants to use collateral as a signaling device: by posting a guarantee, safer borrowers can credibly show their characteristics.
Banks can therefore screen applicants by their degree of riskiness, offering better credit conditions to the safer ones. In this framework, secured loans are always those made to the safer borrowers, as shown by Bester (1985 and 1987) , Chan and Kanatas (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987) .
The positive relationship between borrowers' riskiness and the presence of guarantees on bank loans is a general result in models where the collateral is used as a signaling device.
Theoretical models where secured loans are made to riskier borrowers typically build on different assumptions. The most common, and probably the most compelling, is that guarantees are used as incentive devices in presence of moral hazard problems. Boot et al. (1991) show that if the returns from the project that is financed depend, at least in part, on the degree of effort provided by the borrower -which is unobservable by the bank -and riskier applicants have a higher return from effort, then it is optimal for the bank to require a guarantee to the riskier borrowers in order to limit moral hazard. Similarly, a moral hazard problem is at the origin of the results in Bester (1994) , who shows that when the lender cannot credibly commit to impose bankruptcy to a borrower that cheats on the outcome of his investment, not repaying his debt, the collateral can be used to make the strategic default less attractive, therefore forcing the borrower to truly report his status. Because in equilibrium the incentives to strategically default are negatively correlated with project risk, banks will grant secured loans to riskier borrowers. John et al. (2000) point to a different implication of the agency problems between managers and claimholders. Building on the seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , they show that if, in the event of default, the value of the assets that are posted as collateral is more stable than that of the other assets owned by the firm, managers have a stronger incentive to perk-consume secured than unsecured properties. As a result, equilibrium yields on collateralized debt will be higher than those on uncollateralized debt, in order to compensate for the greater risk of "asset substitution".
Other authors have developed models where a positive relationship between borrowers' riskiness and the presence of guarantees does not depend on moral hazard problems. Coco (1999) , for example, shows that, even with ex-ante asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , if borrowers are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of risk aversion and those more risk averse are less willing to post a collateral on their debt, a screening equilibrium where guarantees are used as a signaling device is not possible, and only risky borrowers may be requested to post collateral. de Meza and Southey (1996) show that when the population is composed of a number of overoptimistic borrowers, projects posting high collateral are more likely to default. Finally, Barro (1976) shows that if the value of the collateral on bank loans is stochastic, and borrowers strategically default when its realization is lower than the sum of the value of the loan and its service, the equilibrium interest rate on secured loans is higher than that on unsecured loans, implying a positive correlation between risk and collateral. As suggested by Coco (1999) , the same result can be explained by the presence of a ceiling on bank interest rates, for example due to usury laws.
Empirical evidence
The heterogeneity of results of the theoretical literature on the risk characteristics of secured bank loans is shared only in part by the results of the empirical studies. Moreover, it is completely at odd with the conventional wisdom among bankers, who believe that banks typically require guarantees on loans made to riskier borrowers.
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Some authors have checked directly whether secured loans have characteristics that plausibly signal them as riskier, considering a large number of variables. 4 The neatest result is that loans with longer duration have a higher probability of being secured, as found by Boot et al. (1991) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) . With respect to the size of loans and borrowers, the results are less clear-cut. Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Elsas and Kranen (2000) find a higher incidence of securitization on larger loans -as one would expect considering that they typically entail a higher risk for the bank -but Boot et al. (1991) find instead a lower incidence. Beger and Udell (1995) find a positive relationship between the size of the borrowing firms, measured by their total assets, and the probability that their lines of credit will be secured, and Harhoff and Körting (1998) , proxying size with the firm's workforce, also find a positive relationship with the presence of guarantees. However, the results of Elsas and Kranen (2000) , showing a negative relationship between collateralization and the borrowers' total sales, are more in line with the common wisdom that smaller borrowers entail higher risk. 5 Harhoff and Körting (1998) also find that the share of secured loans decreases with the number of banking relationships, possibly because multi-banking wipes out the incentives to monitor borrowers' behavior or to require a collateral to firms in financial distress, as suggested by Rajan and Winton (1995) . Finally, Berger and Udell (1995) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) show that loans to borrowers with longer lending relationships -that are typically considered to be less risky -are less likely to be secured. However, Elsas and Kranen (2000) , using data from a survey of German banks, find instead that housebanks have a higher probability of having loans backed by a guarantee.
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The most compelling results on the relationship between risk and guarantees are probably those testing for differences in the interest rate spreads on secured versus unsecured loans. In a seminal contribution, using data from the FED survey on Terms of Bank Lending, Berger and Udell (1990) show that the interest rates on secured loans are on average higher than those on unsecured loans. This result has two major implications: that secured loans are typically made to borrowers considered ex-ante riskier by banks, and that the presence of guarantees is insufficient to offset such higher credit risk. Berger and Udell (1995) confirm this result using data on lines of credit from the same source. John et al. (2000), considering a sample of over 1,000 fixed rate straight debt public issues made between 1993 and 1995, find that yield on collateralized debt is higher than on general debt, even after controlling for credit ratings. Casolaro et al. (2002) , studying a large sample of syndicated credit facilities between 1990 and 2001, also find that secured loans have higher interest rate spreads than unsecured loans.
8 5 These differences might be due to the fact that the size of the borrower is related to his overall creditworthiness, which implies a negative relationship, but reflects also his availability of assets to post as collateral, which implies instead a positive relationship. 6 These results are consistent with the predictions of Boot and Thakor (1994) , who show that an optimal contract implies that credit conditions become more favorable late in the relationship, after the borrower has shown at earlier stages to be able to fulfill his obligations. 7 Elsas and Khranen (2000) justify their result with the argument made by Welch (1997) and Longhofer and Santos (2000) , who show that it is optimal for bank debt to be more senior when lending relationships are stronger. 8 Harhoff and Körting (1998) , at the opposite, using data from a survey of small and medium-size German firms find that the interest rates on secured loans are lower than those on secured loans.
Hypotheses under scrutiny and empirical modeling
The theoretical literature provides straight testable implications for the relationship between borrowers' and loans' riskiness and the presence of guarantees. From the discussion in the previous paragraph it is clear that, when guarantees are used in order to address adverse selection problems induced by information asymmetries, their presence should have no relationship with characteristics of the borrowers' default risk, because this information is not asymmetric. If instead guarantees are used mainly to provide incentives to riskier borrowers in presence of moral hazard problems -and riskier applicants have a higher return from effort -their presence should be positively correlated with ex-ante measures of borrowers' default risk.
Two strictly related empirical models are used in order to test these hypotheses. 9 The first directly verifies the relationship between ex-ante publicly available information on borrowers' default riskiness and the presence of guarantees on their bank loans, thus discriminating between adverse selection and moral hazard theories of secured lending. The second singles out the direct effect on credit risk of the presence of guarantees, by comparing the interest rates charged on secured and unsecured loans made by different banks to a same borrower. Clearly, this measure is untouched by the indirect effect on interest rates originating from the differences in the characteristics of borrowers with secured and unsecured loans.
An important distinction to be made when testing the relationship between risk and collateralization is whether guarantees are assets owned by the borrower (inside collateral) or assets posted by an external grantor (outside collateral). As pointed out by Berger and Udell (2000) , inside collateral simply reorders creditor priority in case of bankruptcy, giving to secured lenders a specific claim on the assets posted as a guarantee. On the contrary, outside 9 These models are derived from very simple theoretical assumptions. Abstracting from agency problems, bank profits, π B , are an increasing function of the interest rate, R, of the value of guarantees, C, and of the probability of repayment, p: π B = f(R, C, p) with f΄R, f΄C, f΄p > 0. Assuming zero profits in the banking sector, the previous expression implies: i) a negative relationship between the presence of collateral and loan riskiness (measured by one minus the probability of repayment), controlling for the interest rate; ii) a negative relationship between the level of the interest rate and the value of collateral, controlling for loan riskiness. Agency problems alter the previous relationship by introducing indirect effects through a dependence of the probability of default on the presence of collateral: p = g(C) with g΄C > 0 or g΄C < 0 depending on the mechanism at work.
collateral is similar to an infusion of equity by the grantor, because it exposes him to the potential losses of the entrepreneurial activity.
The relationship between collateralization and borrowers' and loans' riskiness differs depending on whether inside or outside guarantees are posted. The theoretical literature
shows that inside guarantees are not good signaling devices, because they do not increase the potential losses that a borrower could suffer if he bankrupts. The only exception would be if, by posting some of his assets as guarantees, the borrower experiences a welfare or profit loss, for example because this limits his possibility to dispose of the assets for taking new investment opportunities (as suggested by Smith and Warner, 1979) or for perk consumption (as suggested by John et al., 2000) . A similar reasoning applies for guarantees used as a tool to limit moral hazard by part of borrowers. Therefore, independent on whether there is a positive or negative relationship between risk and the presence of guarantees, it should be expected that such relationship is stronger in the case of outside collateral.
Unfortunately, the distinction between internal and external guarantees has not been considered adequately in the empirical literature, mainly because of the unavailability of data discriminating the two types.
A further distinction, which is partly related to that between internal and external guarantees, is between real and personal guarantees. Real guarantees are typically physical assets or equities that the lender can sell to obtain the payments in case of default of the borrower. Personal guarantees are contractual obligations of third parties to make payments in case of default of the borrower (e.g., a surentyship). As pointed out by Berger and Udell (2000) , personal guarantees typically operate like external collateral, with the exception that they do not give control to specific assets, but they represent a generic claim on the entire wealth of the grantor, who has therefore a large degree of freedom in using and possibly neglecting it.
The potentially different role of real and personal guarantees depends on the outcome of two opposing forces. Real guarantees are potentially more powerful, because they are less easy to dispose of, but they can also be inside, in which case they do not increase the value of assets that the lender can withhold in case of borrower's default. Personal guarantees are less powerful because they can be more easily disposed of, but they are more powerful because they can only be external. With the available information, an a priori ranking of these two effects is impossible; which one dominates is therefore an empirical issue. The empirical analysis that follows does not discriminate between inside and outside guarantees, because this information is not available, but makes a distinction between real and personal guarantees.
As anticipated above, the first model directly verifies what are the borrowers' and loans' characteristics that are more often associated with secured lending, controlling for the interest rate on the loan. Two sets of control variables are included in the regression, describing the characteristics of the borrowers and of the lending relationship. The first set consists of a measure of each borrower's probability of default, of other characteristics that might influence his riskiness (such as his share of physical over total assets and the number of his banking relationships) and of proxies for the degree of information available on his creditworthiness (such as his size and age). The second set consists of measures of loan specific riskiness (such as its size) and of the strength of the lending relationship (such as its time length). In order to control for characteristics specific of the lenders, dummy variables for each bank are introduced. In practice, the following discrete choice specification is assumed:
where: Y ij equals 0 if the loan made by bank i to borrower j is unsecured, 1 if it is secured with real but not personal guarantees, 2 if it is secured with personal guarantees; X ij is a vector of variables specific of the bank-borrower relationship; W j is a vector of characteristics of the borrower; Z i is a vector of bank specific dummies; and K j is a vector of dummy variables for the sector of operation of the borrower and his geographic location. The adoption of a discrete choice model is justified by the fact that the value of the collateral pledged on each loan is not significant information: with the exception of very few cases, loans are either fully secured or unsecured. 10 Equation (1) is estimated using a multinomial logit specification.
The second model, inspired by Berger and Udell (1990) , provides an indirect test of the relationship between riskiness and the presence of guarantees. In particular, it verifies whether, controlling for borrowers' and loans' riskiness, interest rates charged on secured loans are systematically different from interest rates charged on unsecured loans. Clearly, as discussed above, a negative relationship between interest rates and the presence of guarantees is to be expected, because the lender's loss in case of borrower's default is reduced by the collateral's value.
This second model is tested with a regression of each bank loan on two dummies, taking the value of 1 the loan is secured with real or personal guarantees, respectively:
where i ij is the interest rate on the loan made by bank i to borrower j; S ij are two dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the loan is secured, respectively, with real and personal guarantees and 0 otherwise; X ij is a vector of variables describing characteristics of the lending relationship; Z i is a vector of bank specific dummy variables; W j is a vector of borrower specific dummy variables.
Data and summary statistics
The empirical analysis uses information on lines of credit to a large sample of Italian non- Pagano et al. (1998) . 12 For a similar classification, see Sapienza (2003) .
Company Account Data Survey. Table 1 presents some basic statistics by type of guarantee.
Loans secured with real guarantees are 2.1 per cent of all lines of credit; those secured with personal guarantees are 5.4 per cent. 13 The mode of the ratios of the value of the guarantee to that of the loan is zero in all cases. 14 The value is 0 at the 95 th percentile for real guarantees and 94.6 for personal guarantees; it is 99.4 per cent for real guarantees at the 99 th percentile.
These statistics show clearly that, when present, guarantees normally cover the full amount of the loan. The requirement of guarantees that cover only partially the value of the loan, which is largely suggested by the theoretical literature, seems to be irrelevant from an empirical point of view.
15 Table 2 presents summary statistics on the ratio of the value of guarantees to that of loans, with a break down by type of guarantee, size of the lending bank, geographical area of activity and size of the borrower. The ratio of the overall value of real guarantees to that of loans is 5.2 per cent; it is 7.2 per cent for personal guarantees. 16 Larger banks make less recourse to real guarantees, and make a wider use of personal guarantees. Small borrowers have a larger share of loans covered by real guarantees, while the differences are smaller for personal guarantees. Finally, the share of secured loans shows a high variability across geographical areas. Table 3 13 Unfortunately, information is only available on whether a personal guarantee is posted on a given banking relationship, independent on what loan is actually secured. In order to avoid the possibility of attributing a guarantee to an unsecured line of credit made to a borrower that has another type of secured loan with the same bank (e.g., a term loan), banking relationships involving loans other than lines of credit are excluded from the sample used to construct tables 1-3. 14 For guarantees exceeding the value of the loan, the latter value has been used in the numerator. 15 In fact, it is to be expected that when collateral does not cover the full value it is either because the price of assets pledged has reduced since the time when the loan was granted or that personal guarantees have also been posted. In the case of personal guarantees, for which this information is available, it is often found that their value exceeds that of the loan. 16 These ratios are larger than those referring to the number of secured and unsecured loans, showing that larger loans are on average more likely to be secured. Table 4 reports the results of the estimates of the probability of loans being secured, distinguishing between the cases when only real guarantees are posted and when personal guarantees are present.
Empirical results
Guarantees and ex-ante riskiness of borrowers
Estimates are conducted on a sample of 52,359 loans; bank dummies and dummies for the area and the sector of activity of the borrower, included in the regression, are not reported in order to save space. The test for the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), verifying that the multinomial logit framework is to be preferred to standard binomial logit regressions, is unable to reject the null hypothesis that the remaining alternative is irrelevant in the choice on whether to post or not a real or a personal guarantee, respectively, on the loan. 17 The pseudo R-squared of the regression is 0.09.
In the case of real guarantees, the coefficient of the score on the borrower's probability of default is not significantly different from zero. This result is potentially consistent with models motivating the use of guarantees with adverse selection problems, which imply no relationships between guarantees and information available ex-ante to lenders, such as the score. On the contrary, it is not consistent with the hypothesis that real guarantees are used as incentive devices in presence of moral hazard problems, as in Boot et al. (1991) .
Although the supposition cannot be directly verified, the absence of a significant relationship between ex-ante riskiness and the presence of real guarantees is probably due to the fact that real guarantees are mainly assets internal to the borrowing firm. As such, they do not increase the loss suffered in case of default, and therefore have little effect on borrowers' incentives.
A justification for the use of real guarantees, which is consistent with the absence of a relationship with borrower's riskiness but is not based on adverse selection problems, is that they are used in order to provide a priority to some creditors. Indeed, in case of borrower's default, a bank whose loan is secured with an internal guarantee is more likely than other lenders to recover its assets. 17 The test is an application of the Hausman specification test and verifies whether removing one option from the set of choices available (i.e., considering two separate logit regressions) changes
The positive and significant coefficients of the length of the lending relationship and of the dummy variable for borrowers that are more than 20 years old are indeed consistent with the hypothesis that real guarantees are used to provide a priority. Moreover, they are consistent with the argument made by Longhofer and Santos (2000) , that borrowers have an incentive to post collateral when lending relationships are stronger, because in this case banks are more prone to help them in states of financial distress. 18 Furthermore, one can expect that the need to put a specific creditor in a better position than others is likely to be lower when the borrower owns a large share of assets that can be withheld in the event of default. Indeed, consistent with this interpretation, the coefficient of the borrower's share of physical over total assets is negative and significantly different from zero in the case of real guarantees.
In the case of personal guarantees, the coefficient of the score on the borrowers' probability of default is positive, and significantly different from zero. This is consistent with the hypothesis that banks use personal guarantees as incentives, in presence of moral hazard problems. On the contrary, this result is not consistent with the hypothesis that banks use personal guarantees in order to address adverse selection problems.
Additional evidence of the fact that ex-ante riskier borrowers are more likely to be granted loans secured with personal guarantees is given by the negative and significant coefficients of the length of the lending relationship and of the dummy variable for borrowers that are more than 20 years old. In fact, older borrowers and those with a longer lending relationship are typically less risky, because they have a longer record -public and bank specific -on which their expected performance can be judged.
The coefficients of the other control variables, with few exceptions, are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature.
Larger loans typically imply a higher credit risk for the bank. Table 4 shows that the coefficient of loan size is positive for both real and personal guarantees, confirming that real and personal guarantees are indeed used to reduce credit risk.
systematically the parameter estimates; it is distributed as a χ 2 with as many degrees of freedom as parameters to be estimated (see Hausman and McFadden, 1984) . 18 Welch (1997) also suggests that because banks are better equipped to contest priority in financial distress, it is more efficient to give them higher seniority ex-ante. Extending this reasoning one could say that banks with a stronger lending relationship are also in a better position than others to contest priority.
If guarantees were used to give some creditors a better position in case of default, one would expect a positive coefficient of the number of banking relationships. In fact, the estimated coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero for both real and personal guarantees. As suggested by Rajan and Winton (1995) , this apparently counterintuitive result is consistent with the hypothesis that banks are unwilling to require a guarantee on their loans if this has the side effect of making implicitly available to competing lenders the result of their screening activity.
Loans to larger borrowers are more likely to be secured with personal guarantees and less likely to be secured with real guarantees. These results are likely to be the effect of opposing forces. On one side, a number of factors suggest that larger borrowers should be less likely to have secured loans. For example, they have stronger market power than smaller debtors when contracting loan conditions and they are normally less risky, because they are more subject to market's scrutiny and their balance sheets information are more easily available to outside observers. On the other side, smaller borrowers have a better ability in establishing sound lending relationships, which often make the requirement of guarantees unnecessary. Moreover, larger borrowers, that are often part of groups, are likely to have lower costs in using personal guarantees, because they are provided by the holding company or by the other members of the group.
Finally, the coefficient of the interest rate is positive in the case of real guarantees and negative for personal guarantees; in both cases it is significantly different from zero. The positive correlation between interest rates and the presence of real guarantees is probably due to a common factor, not adequately controlled for, which is driving both variables. A likely candidate is unobservable risk, coming from banks' private information about their borrowers' characteristics. In the following section this issue will be addressed more in detail.
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19 Clearly, the presence of an uncontrolled common factor might also bias the estimates of the coefficients of the other explanatory variables (see Yatchew and Griliches, 1985 , for a discussion of specification problems in discrete choice models). In particular, the bias should be positive for the coefficient of the borrower's probability of default, which is likely to be positively correlated with unobserved risk. As such, the effect of the score, the observable measure of borrowers' risk, would partly incorporate unobservable risk too. The bias should instead be negative for all the other coefficients, because loan's value, relationship length, borrower's age, number of banking relationship, borrower's total sales and borrower's share of physical to total assets are all likely to be negatively correlated with unobservable risk.
Ex-ante riskiness of secured vs. unsecured loans
The results of the estimates verifying what are the borrowers' and loans' characteristics that are more often associated with secured lending provide evidence in favor of the hypotheses that real guarantees are used primarily in order to provide a priority to some creditors with respect to others, probably because they are largely internal, and that personal guarantees, which are necessarily external, are used as an incentive device to reduce moral hazard problems.
The estimates of the model in equation (2), reported in table 5, provide some additional evidence on the effect of the presence of guarantees on loan riskiness. Clearly, a major problem in estimating the effect of the presence of guarantees on a loan's interest rate is the potential endogeneity. Indeed, it is likely that riskier borrowers both have higher interest rates and they are required to post a guarantee on their bank loans. If riskiness was not adequately controlled for (for example because banks have private information), this would lead to a positive relationship between interest rates and the presence of guarantees, a result that is indeed found by the vast majority of the empirical literature.
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In order to take care of the endogeneity problem, the regression presented in table 5 controls for borrower and lender specific characteristics, by introducing bank and form specific dummies, as well as for some characteristics specific of each lending relationship The results show that, better controlling for borrowers' and loans' riskiness than it was possible in previous empirical studies, the effect of the presence of guarantees is that of reducing the interest rate charged on the loans granted by banks. Indeed, in table 5 both coefficients of the dummy variables for secured loans are negative and significantly different from zero.
This result is quite novel to the literature, but it is not unexpected: controlling for borrowers' risk, the first order effect of the presence of a guarantee on a bank loan is to reduce the loss for the lender in case of default.
22 Indeed, all theories providing a rationale 20 As mentioned above, one notable exception is Harhoff and Körting (1998) . 21 On this issue see, in particular, Ongena and Smith (2000) and Detragiache et al. (2000) . 22 See, in particular, the discussion in footnote 9.
for a positive relationship between collateral and the interest rate charged on a loan build on the assumption that the presence of guarantees has unobservable effects on the loans' riskiness. Better controlling for loan riskiness, it is therefore to be expected that the intuitive negative relationship between the presence of guarantees and the interest rate charged on a bank loan is recovered.
Clearly, even introducing borrower specific fixed effects, the control for loan riskiness is far from perfect, because the amount of private information on a borrower (and therefore his perceived riskiness) is idiosyncratic to each bank, hence to each lending relationship.
However, as already argued, the presence of unmeasured loan riskiness introduces a positive bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the dummies for the presence of guarantees. In its absence, the negative coefficients reported in table 5 should be even larger in absolute value.
Conclusions
The empirical evidence presented in this paper sheds some additional light with respect to the previous literature on the determinants of bank secured lending, partly reconciling academic research and the common wisdom of practitioners.
Using unique data on lending relationships it has been possible: first, to discriminate between adverse selection and moral hazard theories of secured lending, by verifying the relationship between ex-ante publicly available information on borrowers' default riskiness and the presence of guarantees on their bank loans; second, to single out the direct effect on credit risk of the presence of guarantees, by comparing the interest rates charged on secured and unsecured loans made by different banks to a same borrower.
The evidence presented is consistent with the view that real and personal guarantees have a different role in loan contracts. Real guarantees are mainly internal and therefore they are used essentially to provide a priority to some creditors with respect to others; on the contrary, they are less likely to be used as incentive devices in presence of moral hazard problems. In fact, the latter case would imply a positive relationship between their presence and borrowers' ex-ante riskiness, which is not found. Still, the presence of internal guarantees reduces the banks' credit risk, as it is shown by the fact that, once other sources of riskiness are adequately controlled for, secured loans are charged lower interest rates.
Personal guarantees, that are mainly external, are typically used as incentive devices in presence of moral hazard problems. Indeed, they are more likely to be present in loans made to borrowers with an ex-ante higher probability of default. Similar to real guarantees, personal guarantees reduce credit risk, as shown by the fact that secured loans are charged lower interest rates. The dependent variable equals 0 if the loan is unsecured, 1 if it is secured with real guarantees and 2 if it is secured with personal guarantees (see equation 1 in the text). Borrowers' total sales are four years averages between 1992 and 1996. Geographical, sector and bank dummies, not reported, are included in the regression. For variables' and sample's definitions, see also the note to table 1. The test for independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is distributed as a chi-squared under the null hypothesis of no systematic differences between logit and multinomial logit estimate, with as many degrees of freedom as parameters to be estimated. *** indicates significance at 1 per cent level. ** at 5 per cent and * at 10 per cent. Table 5 Guarantees and interest rates on bank loans The dependent variable is the level of the interest rate on the loan. Bank and borrower dummies, not reported, are included. For the definition of the variables and of the sample, see also the note to tables 1 and 4. *** indicates significance at 1 per cent level, ** at 5 per cent and * at 10 per cent. 
